Introduction
After 1945, few in Britain would dispute that they, along with the rest of Western Europe, were “dependent” upon American nuclear strength. Yet by the 1960s, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan had begun to speak of a nuclear “interdependence” between Britain and the United States, and even declared his ultimate goal of a British nuclear “independence” from the US. [1] The use of these terms in fact reflected deep divisions in Anglo-American nuclear strategy between 1957 and 1963. To determine whether the Anglo-American nuclear relationship was one of continued British “dependence” upon the United States or a novel “interdependence”, it is crucial to examine the motives behind the nuclear rhetoric of each side. The Kennedy and Eisenhower administrations also spoke of a nuclear “interdependence” within NATO, but meant something almost entirely distinct from Macmillan. [2] As such, an over-reliance upon these terms themselves hides the irregular progression which led to the creation of an independent British nuclear force in 1963. Outlining the history of Anglo-American nuclear relations between 1957 and 1963 with an emphasis upon both countries’ pursuits of greater nuclear sovereignty, power and control reveals a far more comprehensive picture of the dynamics behind the “dependence-interdependence” debate.
The Anglo-American nuclear relationship was originally far more disjointed than the war-built Anglo-American “special relationship”. Anglo-American scientific cooperation in the Manhattan Project had largely contributed to its success. [3] However, in 1946, President Harry Truman signed the McMahon Act, which strictly prohibited the exchange of American atomic secrets, even with other allied nations. [4] British Prime Minister Clement Attlee felt blindsided by this decision, as it left Britain entirely dependent upon the United States’ nuclear guarantee. [5] This was the impetus for the British atomic weapons program, which produced both an atomic bomb by 1952, and a thermonuclear bomb by 1957. [6] The Suez and Sputnik crises of 1956 and 1957 produced a resurgence in Anglo-American nuclear cooperation culminating in the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement; this again enabled the strategic exchange of nuclear information and materials between the United States and Britain. [7] The Skybolt Crisis of 1962, however, brought Anglo-American nuclear relations to a breaking point, [8] and at the ensuing Nassau Conference the true power dynamic between the two nations seemed to reveal itself.
Neither the British nor the Americans ever argued for outright continued British “dependence” upon American nuclear strength. Rather, each advocated a different conception of “interdependence”. [9] Prescient here is John Baylis’ emphasis on the roles of belief and culture in nuclear strategy, [10] which contributed to each leader’s deliberations and views. For Macmillan, “interdependence” was a logical division of nuclear tasks between the US and the UK, wherein both nations became partially “dependent” on the other. [11] Macmillan didn’t believe this ambition precluded the creation of an “independent” British nuclear deterrent force, which he believed was also in American interests. [12] For President Dwight Eisenhower, “interdependence” meant the creation of a US-led Multilateral Force (MLF) within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), in which nuclear partnership with Britain was merely the first step. [13] President John F. Kennedy ultimately moved away from the proposal for a Multilateral Force, recognising its unpopularity among European leaders. For Kennedy, “interdependence” meant the existence of multiple national nuclear programs under US leadership. [14] While Macmillan’s notion of the term “interdependence” was paradoxical and chiefly concerned with appearance, Eisenhower’s was idealistic and unachievable, and only Kennedy’s proved successful due to its allowance for nuclear sovereignty in Anglo-American nuclear relations.
Suez and Sputnik (1956-7)
In January 1957, Eisenhower invited Macmillan to a summit in Bermuda with the aim of strengthening the Anglo-American nuclear defence posture. [15] Having humbled Britain on the world stage during the Suez Crisis, Eisenhower hoped to “mend” the Anglo-American relationship by appeasing British nuclear aspirations. [16] The summit bolstered Britain’s national image through plans to retrofit British bombers to carry American nuclear bombs, and the instalment of 60 American Thor nuclear missiles in Britain. [17] The missiles remained under American control, as required by US law, but required joint Anglo-American authorisation to launch. [18] It was the first instance of a deployable British nuclear deterrent, albeit one under only partial British control. However, the 1957 White Paper on Defence, produced after Bermuda, foreshadowed an increased British reliance on nuclear weapons instead of conventional forces. [19]
The launch of Sputnik on 4 October 1957 inspired fears of massive Soviet technological advancement, and had an even more dramatic effect on Anglo-American nuclear cooperation. [20] The British Ambassador to the United States, Harold Caccia, composed a telegram to Washington three days after Sputnik. He argued (in line with the British conception of “interdependence”) that Soviet technology had only surged ahead because of redundancies in Anglo-American nuclear research. [21] This seemed to strike a chord with Eisenhower, who himself harboured misgivings about the McMahon Act. [22] Eisenhower invited British officials to a conference in Washington on October 25th, where a “Declaration of Common Purpose” was drafted “advocating greater interdependence between the two countries”. [23] While internal divisions in the State Department lingered about how far this “interdependence” should go, the McMahon Act was amended to enable the exchange of nuclear information with Britain. [24] Macmillan saw the removal of the McMahon obstacle as “the great prize” [25] in his plan to develop an independently controlled British nuclear deterrent through American assistance.
The Mutual Defence Agreement (1958)
On 30 June 1958, the ‘Mutual Defence Agreement’ (MDA) was passed, amending the McMahon Act to allow the president to give restricted information to countries which had achieved “substantial progress” in the nuclear field. [26] In 1958, only Britain met this requirement. While the MDA was effectively an Anglo-American nuclear relationship, it was intentionally de facto. Eisenhower still pursued his long-term goal of creating a US-led MLF incorporating multiple countries’ nuclear and conventional arsenals, and felt no need to limit the list to Britain. Macmillan somewhat naively pursued the development of this Anglo-American nuclear relationship with enthusiasm, believing it a route capable of assuring British nuclear “independence” one day.
At meetings in Washington (27-28 August 1958) and at the Sandia Laboratory in New Mexico (15-17 September), Anglo-American scientists benefited from a comprehensive exchange of nuclear information. [27] Upon hearing of American interest in the British ‘Grapple Z’ thermonuclear program, Macmillan reflected that “we are as far, and even further advanced in the art than ourAmerican friends,”. [28] Extensive preparations were also made for programs which would improve British weapon systems. The MDA and Anglo-American scientific meetings are widely considered the beginning of the Anglo-American “special nuclear relationship”, which though initially de facto, lasted throughout the Cold War and continues in the present day. [29]
Baylis suggests that this period of cooperation has been historiographically interpreted in two major ways, both of which contribute to the “dependence-interdependence” debate. The first argument sees “perfidious” British diplomats as having abused the Anglo-American “special relationship” to influence US policy. [30] The second argument instead suggests that it was the Americans who manipulated British ambitions in order to assure a strategic British dependence on the US which could be leveraged into support for American defence initiatives. [31] Both interpretations imply an asymmetrical game with separate objectives on each side. Eisenhower, eschewing any straightforward pro-“dependence” platform, however, was in fact concerned about the “overdependence” of the Europeans upon American nuclear power in 1957-8. He pursued nuclear cooperation in 1958 as a means of reducing this reliance while maintaining US control. [32] All in all, the new Anglo-American nuclear relationship in 1957-8 was the result of a tangle of complex and contradictory interests, and a unique moment of perceived American weakness following Sputnik.
The V-Bomber Force (1957-60) and the Skybolt Crisis (1962-3)
The period between 1958 and 1962 was the first time the Anglo-American nuclear strategy was considered one of “interdependence,” but many contradictions arise which complicate any narrow justification for “dependence” or “interdependence” alone.
The British nuclear delivery system, the V-Bomber, came into service in 1957-8, but was from the start threatened with obsolescence due to the advent of the missile age. [33] In the division of tasks designated at Washington-Sandia, the British had agreed to abstain from missile technology development, which appears in retrospect a limitation by the Americans. [34] Nevertheless, in 1958 the British began a haphazard development of the Blue Streak and Blue Steel II missiles to keep the dream of an independent British deterrent alive. [35] In January 1959, Chief Scientific Adviser to the Minister of Defence, Sir Frederick Brundrett, after a visit to the United States, proposed that Blue Steel II should be discontinued. [36] Relatedly, the US Congress passed a special amendment to the MDA in May, permitting the “exchange of special nuclear materials” between the two countries. [37]
Eisenhower hoped to entice the British with American missile technology, which he offered in exchange for the establishment of a US Polaris missile base at Holy Loch, Scotland. [38] The Skybolt missiles he offered the British could be launched from the V-Bomber at a distance of 1,500 miles, and promised to finally give Britain’s nuclear deterrent teeth. [39] David Reynolds suggests that Britain was “obliged to take whatever the USA offered” in the 1960 Skybolt deal, or else risk the obsolescence of their V-Bomber Force. [40] This acute British technological “dependency” upon American policy would culminate in the Skybolt Crisis of 1962, when the Kennedy Administration cancelled the delivery of the missiles for financial reasons. [41] Historians have therefore described the Skybolt crisis as a potentially destructive communication breakdown in Anglo-American relations. [42] The Kennedy Administration appeared to have had no scruples about ruining the British nuclear weapons timetable through Skybolt’s cancellation, revealing its highly contradictory conception of “interdependence”.
Kennedy’s Secretary of Defence, Robert McNamara, has been called the “villain” of Anglo-American nuclear relations, [43] and was himself responsible for the cancellation of Skybolt. [44] His attitudes, if harshly calculative, nonetheless reflected Kennedy’s shift in nuclear doctrine from Eisenhowerian “massive retaliation” to one of “flexible response”. [45] This shift served Kennedy well in a number of instances, including the Berlin and Cuban crises, [46] but made the problem of integrating the emergent national nuclear forces far more difficult than under the Eisenhower administration. By 1960, France had also emerged as a nuclear power, and the West Germans had begun clamouring for their own nuclear program. [47] This European component of the Anglo-American crisis also involved McNamara directly.
Tensions arose from two famous but jarring speeches McNamara delivered on nuclear strategy in 1962. In Athens, he spoke directly to the NATO council about the current controversies within the alliance. [48] He argued that it was essential that European countries continue to develop conventional forces such that a future “major nuclear war” could be limited to the European continent. [49] His comment that “relatively weak nuclear forces” were not likely to “perform the function of deterrence,” seemingly undercut both the British and French nuclear programs. [50] At Ann Arbor he clarified the American view that “small national deterrents” are “dangerous”, lacking in credibility and “prone to obsolescence”. [51] While after the fact, he claimed that his comments were only directed at the French and West Germans, [52] McNamara’s speeches was perceived by many in the UK Foreign Office as evidence of the Kennedy Administration’s suspicion of the idea of an independent British nuclear deterrent, which only Skybolt now promised to create.
Throughout 1960-2, Macmillan’s dogged push toward an independent British deterrent had continually aggravated the Americans. The 1962 UK Defence White Paper claimed that the British deterrent was “by itself enough to make a potential aggressor fear that our retaliation would inflict destruction beyond any level which he would be prepared to tolerate.” [53] Kennedy directly communicated to Macmillan that this kind of British nuclear bravado “may well have the effect of convincing de Gaulle of the rightness of his course . . . (and) hasten the day when Germany will pursue a national program.” [54] While Kennedy continued to pursue the MLF concept, Macmillan astutely observed that “the United States (also)... would stand to benefit by being able to share nuclear responsibilities” and that “other countries would inevitably begin acquiring their own nuclear capabilities, no matter how crude these might be.” [55] Macmillan’s suggestion implied that the United States could only hope to maintain control of newly nuclear countries by indebting them to American technology. Kennedy, however, was firm and conclusive: “the policy of the US administration would be to try to respond to French concerns over the nuclear arrangements of the alliance rather than to assist their national program, and the United States would expect British support in this endeavor.” [56] Kennedy spat Macmillan’s advice back at him: the United States was Britain’s nuclear benefactor, and it was time to ‘pay up’ by getting in line with American policy.
The British thus interpreted the cancellation of Skybolt as rooted in Kennedy and McNamara’s suspicion of national nuclear deterrents as a whole. [57] This was half true. There were legitimate concerns regarding the costs associated with the project, [58] but the contradictions in American interest were apparent. On the 7th of November, when the Skybolt deal was cancelled, the British ministers were dumbstruck. [59] The Anglo-American squabble which ensued revealed the intrinsic dependency of the British on American goodwill. [60] Most harmfully, it stood in embarrassing contradiction to Macmillan’s rhetoric of a nuclear “interdependence” between the two countries. [61]
The Nassau Agreement (1962)
In the fallout of the Skybolt Crisis, Kennedy and Macmillan met in Nassau on 21 December in an attempt to reconcile and restore the Anglo-American nuclear relationship. At the Nassau Conference, Kennedy offered the British the more advanced Polaris missiles to make up for Skybolt’s cancellation. [62] These were more strategically viable than Skybolt, and could be integrated into a British nuclear submarine force. [63] But the catch was a guarantee to make the weapons available at a later date for integration within a Multilateral Force. [64] The same deal was offered to the French, who stubbornly refused. [65] De Gaulle saw the initiative for what it was – an American bid for control over British (and French) nuclear weapons.
France played a large role in Anglo-American deliberations at Nassau for a number of reasons. Primarily, Britain’s application for membership into the European Economic Community (EEC) was in progress during the Nassau talks, and de Gualle had threatened to veto it. [66] De Gaulle denounced closer Anglo-American nuclear consolidation, and held true to his word after the Polaris agreement was struck. [67] He justified his decision at a press conference on 14 January 1963, arguing that Britain was trapped in a dangerous cycle of nuclear dependency on the United States. [68] As Reynolds observes, in 1962 as in 1960, Britain had no choice but to accept the American deal, even if it endangered the long-term independence of the British nuclear deterrent force. [69] However, because France never accepted US nuclear assistance, the MLF was never formed, and the British nuclear force remained independent. [70] Thus, while the Polaris deal resulted in what was to effectively become an independent British deterrent, this outcome was accidental in a dynamic French-Anglo-American struggle for greater control over NATO nuclear strategy.
In the same vein, the story was not entirely one of British “dependence” on the US : at Nassau, confronted by extensive European opposition to the idea, Kennedy began to express scepticism of the creation of the MLF. He admitted frankly in February 1963, that “the logical course for each country was to have its own deterrent. Anything less was illogical. By the same token, it was in the US interest to retain the control it now had.” [71]
Conclusion
The question of whether the story of Anglo-American nuclear relations during the years of 1957-1963 is one of British “dependence” or true Anglo-American “interdependence” is therefore itself anachronous. It would be contradictory to consider the Nassau Agreement as anything other than evidence of British “dependence” upon the United States for nuclear weapons. And yet, in the long-term, it also made possible the “interdependence” and even “independence” that Macmillan long desired. Thus, if one answer must be chosen, the British were indeed more “dependent” on than “interdependent” with US nuclear policy in 1957-63. But this simplistic view largely misses the supreme role played by sovereignty in Anglo-American nuclear relations which typified these years.
Due to its atomic monopoly, the United States enjoyed an unprecedented supra-sovereignty in the immediate post-war period, and felt the responsibility not only of its own interests but those of nations across the world. Many European nations, Britain being no exception, unsurprisingly came to see the possession of an independent nuclear force as a prerequisite for greater sovereignty. [72] Both the British and French programs were explicitly designed to give them greater influence over American decision-making, as respective nuclear arsenals would mark them independent actors in a nuclear game. [73] The zero-sum nature of nuclear war made this the only practical advantage to Anglo-French nuclear capability. One can readily understand the Americans’ resistance to dampening their own nuclear sovereignty, as Macmillan seems to have expected. [74] However, as he intelligently acknowledged, it was also inevitable that Britain and France would acquire their own independent nuclear forces. It was likewise inevitable, as Kennedy stated, that the US would attempt to curb these forces to remain the undisputed leader of the Western world. In truth, no matter the merits of any given ‘model’ of international nuclear strategy, the equilibrium of nuclear “dependence” was, like all international relationships, determined by power, sovereignty, and control.
Endnotes
[1] John Baylis, “Exchanging Nuclear Secrets”, 42.
[2] Ian Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship, Britain’s Deterrent and America, 1957-1962, 10-11.
[3] Nigel Ashton, Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cold War: The Irony of Interdependence, 152.
[4] John Baylis and Kristian Stoddart, The British Nuclear Experience: The Roles of Beliefs, Culture and Identity, 74.
[5] S.J. Ball, “Military Nuclear Relations Between the United States and Great Britain under the Terms of the McMahon Act, 1946-1958”, 439-40.
[6] Baylis, Experience, 76.
[7] Baylis, Experience, 78, 82.
[8] Michael Middeke, “Anglo-American Nuclear Weapons Cooperation After the Nassau Conference: The British Policy of Interdependence”, 71.
[9] Middeke, “Anglo-American”, 69-70.
[10] Baylis, Experience, 1-2.
[11] Middeke, “Anglo-American”, 70.
[12] Middeke, “Anglo-American”, 71.
[13] Ashton, Kennedy, 154.
[14] Matthew Jones, “Prelude to the Skybolt Crisis: The Kennedy Administration’s Approach to British and French Strategic Nuclear Policies in 1962”, 109.
[15] Baylis, Experience, 79.
[16] Clark, Nuclear, 2.
[17] Baylis, Experience, 80.
[18] Baylis, Experience, 80.
[19] Martin S. Navias, Nuclear Weapons and British Strategic Planning, 1955-1958, 188.
[20] Baylis, Experience, 81.
[21] Baylis, Experience, 81.
[22] Ashton, Kennedy, 153.
[23] Baylis, Experience, 82.
[24] Baylis, Experience, 83.
[25] Baylis, Experience, 75.
[26] Baylis, Experience, 86.
[27] Baylis, Experience, 89. 28 Baylis, Experience, 89.
[29] Baylis, Experience, 93.
[30] Baylis, Experience, 92.
[31] Baylis, Experience, 92.
[32] Baylis, Experience, 93.
[33] Ashton, Kennedy, 153.
[34] Middeke, “Anglo-American”, 70.
[35] Ashton, Kennedy, 154.
[36] Ashton, Kennedy, 154.
[37] Clark, Nuclear, 3.
[38] Jones, “Prelude”, 62.
[39] Ashton, Kennedy, 154.
[40] David Reynolds, “Rethinking Anglo-American Relations”, 97-8.
[41] Jones, “Prelude”, 102.
[42] Middeke, “Anglo-American”, 71.
[43] Ashton, Kennedy, 157.
[44] Ashton, Kennedy, 157.
[45] Ashton, Kennedy, 156.
[46] Clark, Nuclear, 2.
[47] Jones, “Prelude”, 60-1.
[48] Jones, “Prelude”, 76.
[49] Jones, “Prelude”, 76.
[50] Jones, “Prelude”, 77.
[51] Jones, “Prelude”, 59.
[52] Jones, “Prelude”, 89.
[53] Jones, “Prelude”, 64.
[54] Jones, “Prelude”, 64.
[55] Jones, “Prelude”, 65.
[56] Jones, “Prelude”, 66.
[57] Jones, “Prelude”, 102.
[58] Ashton, Kennedy, 167.
[59] Jones, “Prelude”, 102.
[60] Ashton, Kennedy, 159.
[61] Clark, Nuclear, 16.
[62] Jones, “Prelude”, 104.
[63] Jones, “Prelude”, 104.
[64] Jones, “Prelude”, 102.
[65] Jones, “Prelude”, 105.
[66] Ashton, Kennedy, 156.
[67] Jones, “Prelude”, 75.
[68] Jones, “Prelude”, 105.
[69] David Reynolds, “Rethinking Anglo-American Relations”, 97-8.
[70] Middeke, “Anglo-American”, 93.
[71] Jones, “Prelude”, 109.
[72] Jones, “Prelude”, 63.
[73] Baylis, Experience, 74 and Jones, “Prelude”, 80.
[74] Middeke, “Anglo-American”, 95.
This piece was written by Kyle Xander Pidgeon, and edited by
Expand for Further Reading List
Primary Sources
“The British Bomb and the United States - Part One” on National Security Archive. Link: https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/nuclear-vault/2021-05-13/british-bomb-united-states-part-one. Last Accessed November 24th, 2023.
Secondary Sources (books)
Ashton, Nigel J., Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cold War: The Irony of Interdependence (Palgrave Macmillan Limited: 2002).
Baylis, John and Kristan Stoddart, The British Nuclear Experience: The Roles of Beliefs, Culture and Identity (Oxford University Press: 2014).
———, “Exchanging Nuclear Secrets: Laying the Foundations of the Anglo-American Nuclear Relationship” in Diplomatic History (Winter 2001) Vol 25, No. 1, pp. 31-61.
———, Ambiguity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy 1945-1964 (Oxford University Press: 1995).
Clark, Ian, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship: Britain’s Deterrent and America, 1957-1962 (Oxford University Press: 1994).
Gill, David James, Britain and the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy, 1964-1970 (Stanford University Press: 2014).
Navias, Martin S., Nuclear Weapons and British Strategic Planning, 1955-1958 (Oxford University Press: 1991).
Trachtenberg, Marc, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963 (Princeton University Press: 1999)
Secondary Sources (journal articles)
Ball, SJ, “Military Nuclear Relations Between the United States and Great Britain under the terms of the McMahon Act, 1946-1958” in The Historical Journal (1995) Vol 38, No. 2, pp. 439-454.
Baylis, John, “The 1958 Anglo-American Mutual Defence Agreement: The Search for Nuclear Independence” in Journal of Strategic Studies (2008) Vol 31, No. 3, pp. 425-466.
Clark, Ian and David Angell, “Britain, the United States and the Control of Nuclear Weapons: The Diplomacy of the Thor Deployment 1956–58” in Diplomacy & Statecraft (Fall 2007) Vol 2, No. 3, pp. 153-177.
Jones, Matthew, “Prelude to the Skybolt Crisis: The Kennedy Administration’s Approach to British and French Strategic Nuclear Policy in 1962” in Journal of Cold War Studies (Spring 2019) Vol 21, No. 2, pp. 58-109.
Melissen, Jan, “The Restoration of the Nuclear Alliance: Great Britain and Atomic Negotiations with the United States, 1957-58” in Contemporary Record (2008) Vol 6, No. 1, pp. 72-106.
Middeke, Michael, “Anglo-American Nuclear Weapons Cooperation After the Nassau Conference: The British Policy of Interdependence” in Journal of Cold War Studies (Spring 2000) Vol 2, No. 2, pp. 69-96.
Reynolds, David, “Rethinking Anglo-American Relations” in International Af airs (Royal Institute of International Af airs 1944-) (Winter 1988-1989) Vol. 65, No. 1, pp. 89-111.